Triple Crisis blogger Kevin P. Gallagher was recently interviewed by GlobalPolicyTV on the new economics of capital controls and how they are helping correct international markets. The interview is based on his new PERI Working Paper, “The Myth of Financial Protectionism: The New (and Old) Economics of Capital Controls.”
Emerging markets have fallen victim to unstable capital flows in the wake of the financial crisis. In an attempt to mitigate the accompanying asset bubbles and exchange rate pressures that come with such volatility, a number of emerging markets resorted to capital controls. Although these actions have largely been supported by the International Monetary Fund, some policy-makers and economists have decried capital controls as protectionist measures that can cause spillovers that unduly harm other nations.
Recently-published research shows that these claims are unfounded. According to the new welfare economics of capital controls, unstable capital flows to emerging markets can be viewed as negative externalities on recipient countries. Therefore regulations on cross-border capital flows are tools to correct for market failures that can make markets work better and enhance growth, not worsen it.
Gillian Tett (“Fears of worse to come fuel debate over capital controls”, December 16) highlights the new and important Bank of England paper on capital flows and financial crises that argues how cross-border capital flows continue to plague the world economy and will continue to do so in alarming ways to 2050. The Bank rightly argues for cross-border regulation and co-ordination on capital flows – traditionally referred to as capital controls.
Juan O’Farrell, guest blogger
The increasing global economic uncertainty and the prospects of a flight-to-quality, with money flowing out of developing towards developed countries, raise the question of how prepared developing countries are to protect their economies from external shocks in the coming year. But volatility of financial flows also means that, most probably, following capital flight driven by the eurozone crisis emerging markets will again experience a surge in speculative financial inflows. The threat of continued ‘boom and bust’ cycles and lack of responses from international forums like the G20 and the IMF to address global monetary chaos makes the need for central banks to take action even more urgent.
There is a welcome shift in Latin America as countries continue their slow process of acceptance and de-stigmatisation of capital account regulations. In September this year Costa Rica joined the group of countries using these regulations, when it established that short-term foreign loans received by banks and other financial entities will be subject to a holding deposit of 15% of the value of the investment.
The G20 meeting in Cannes earlier this month was derailed by the pressing eurozone crisis. Actors were disappointed if they were looking for concrete action on global imbalances and the food crisis, let alone the new global monetary system that French President Nicolas Sarkozyboasted would be the goal of the summit when he first took the helm as host. But behind the scenes, the G20 actually delivered on a set of “coherent conclusions” on the management of speculative capital flows in emerging markets that should not be overlooked, especially by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Sarkozy assumed his role as head of the G20 during a period of excessive volatility in global capital markets that continues to this day. Because of loose monetary policy, low interest rates and a slow recovery in the North Atlantic, accompanied by high interest rates and rapid growth in emerging markets, the world’s investors flocked from north to south – to Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan and others. More recently, in response to eurozone jitters, capital has retreated from emerging markets to the “safety” of the United States – showing how dangerous speculative capital flows can be. New work released by the IMF this week suggests they are picking and choosing their direction from the G20.
Aldo Caliari, guest blogger, part of our 2011 Spotlight G20 Series
When the first G20 Summit was launched in 2008 in order to provide an emergency response to the global financial crisis, the premise was that dramatic reforms were needed in a short period of time. Those reforms could never happen in the slow-moving machineries of the institutions with full representation of all countries, such as the UN, hence, the need for the G20.
Three years down the road, and based on the preliminary agreements that one can foresee happening in the coming Summit in Cannes, the G20 has negligible progress to show, calling such premises into question. The world veers dangerously close to a new global recession that, if it happens, will catch developing countries in a worse position than three years ago. The President of the World Bank informed last month that developing countries’ fiscal positions are, in the average, two percentage points of GDP down from where they were pre-crisis. In the face of what is arguably a more pressing emergency than three years ago, the Group cannot even agree to throw its full weight behind the coordinated stimulus measures of the kind and scale to which they’d previously agreed. The idea that grand agreements can be reached by the most powerful countries, if only small countries stop acting as spoilers or brakes in the multilateral machinery with their delaying tactics or parochial views, has evidently no merit to it.
Bloggers Kevin P. Gallagher and Ilene Grabel were interviewed by The Real News Network on the G20 and capital controls, as part of our 2011 Spotlight G20 Series. Watch the full interview:
Read other Triple Crisis posts on capital controls.
Read more about GDAE’s work on capital controls.
Jose Antonio Ocampo, Stephany Griffith-Jones and Kevin P. Gallagher, part of our 2011 Spotlight G20 Series
When French President Nicolas Sarkozy took the reins as host of this year’s G-20 summit, to be held in Cannes on November 3-4, he called on the International Monetary Fund to develop an enforceable “code of conduct” for the use of capital controls (or capital-account regulations, as we prefer to call them) in the world economy. The IMF followed through by publishing a preliminary set of guidelines this past April.
Regulation of cross-border capital flows has been strangely absent from the G-20’s agenda, which is aimed at strengthening financial regulation. But they are a central element in the financial volatility that incited calls for stronger regulation in the first place. The IMF has shown that those countries that deployed capital-account regulations were among the least hard-hit during the worst of the global financial crisis. Since 2009, it has accepted and even recommended that such regulations are useful to manage the massive inflows of “hot money” into emerging markets.
That said, while the IMF’s proposed code is a step in the right direction, it is misguided. So, the G-20’s endorsement of the Fund’s guidelines would not be wise for a world economy trying to recover from one financial crisis while preventing the next one.
Ilene Grabel, part of our 2011 Spotlight G20 Series
Remember the WTO– the institution that we loved to hate? We haven’t been hearing much from or about the institution since its 2003 meeting in Cancun Mexico. That meeting marked the emergence of open conflict between wealthy and developing nations on a number of issues (such as agricultural protection). The conflict left the institution frozen and irrelevant. It now stands on the sidelines as policymakers crisscross the globe signing bi- and multi-lateral agreements.
The G20 seems to be outpacing the WTO in the march toward irrelevance. When it was organized in the early days of the financial meltdown, many progressives (including me) viewed the G20 as an embryo from which new and at least somewhat more inclusive discussions of global economic policy could emerge. In its early days the shock of the global crisis seemed to have engendered a genuine “Keynesian moment.” G20 leaders collectively declared the death of the Washington Consensus, indicted the financial sector for its misdeeds, acknowledged the economic firepower of the rapidly growing developing countries that became new lenders to the IMF, and took tentative steps toward amplification of the voice of developing countries at the IMF and World Bank.
There has been a certain view, that was already quite popular around the time Strauss-Kahn still managed the IMF, that with Christine Lagarde the Fund has become less orthodox, not just regarding capital controls, but now also supposedly on fiscal issues. See for example the article in the NYTimes by Liz Alderman.
In the last World Economic Outlook, the Fund argues (WEO, p. 110) that Argentina’s inflation results from excessively expansionary policies (no analysis backs this claim and the effects of a more devalued currency and commodity prices are not discussed) and suggests (p. 42) that monetary tightening is necessary. Also, the report continues the tone of the previous WEO, suggesting that in developed countries fiscal adjustment should continue to reduce the debt burden, and in developing ones, like Argentina, to avoid overheating.